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This paper studies how the investment in adaptation can influence the participation in an
international environmental agreement (IEA) when countries decide in adaptation before they
choose their levels of emissions. Two types of agreements are studied, a complete agreement for
which countries coordinate their decisions on adaptation and emissions, and an adaptation
agreement for which there is only coordination when countries decide their levels of adaptation. In
both cases, we assume that the degree of effectiveness of adaptation is bounded from above, in
order words, adaptation can alleviate the environmental problem, but it cannot solve it by itself
leading the vulnerability of the country to almost zero. Our results show that the grand coalition
could be stable for both types of agreement, but for extremely high degrees of effectiveness
of adaptation. If this condition is not satisfied, the model predicts low levels of membership.
The standard result of three countries for the complete agreement. For the adaptation
agreement participation can be higher than three, but not higher than six countries. In any
case, we can conclude that under reasonable values for the degree of effectiveness of
adaptation, in our model adaptation does not promote participation in an IEA.
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Abstract
This paper studies how the investment in adaptation can influence the participation in an
international environmental agreement (IEA) when countries decide in adaptation before they
choose their levels of emissions. Two types of agreements are studied, a complete agreement
for which countries coordinate their decisions on adaptation and emissions, and an adaptation
agreement for which there is only coordination when countries decide their levels of adaptation.
In both cases, we assume that the degree of effectiveness of adaptation is bounded from above, in
order words, adaptation can alleviate the environmental problem, but it cannot solve it by itself
leading the vulnerability of the country to almost zero. Our results show that the grand coalition
could be stable for both types of agreement, but for extremely high degrees of effectiveness of
adaptation. If this condition is not satisfied, the model predicts low levels of membership. The
standard result of three countries for the complete agreement. For the adaptation agreement
participation can be higher than three, but not higher than six countries. In any case, we can
conclude that under reasonable values for the degree of effectiveness of adaptation, in our model
adaptation does not promote participation in an IEA.
Keywords: international environmental agreements, adaptation-mitigation game, vulnerability, effectiveness of adaptation, complete agreement, adaptation agreement
JEL Classification System: D62, F53, H41, Q54
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1

Introduction

Countries can choose between mitigation and adaptation to face transboundary pollution problems as global warming. The former reduces the amount of emissions and the latter reduces
environmental damages without affecting the level of pollution. An important difference between these two types of policies is that mitigation has public/international good characteristics
while adaptation has private/national good characteristics. The previous distinction between
adaptation and mitigation states at least two important issues to address. One is the optimal
policy-mix the countries should implement. The other is whether adaptation plays against or
in favor of international cooperation. The recent literature indicates that adaptation can promote cooperation. Bayramoglu et al. (2018) solve a mitigation-adaptation game and find that
the participation in an emission agreement can be high when emissions are strategic complements. On the other hand, Breton and Sbragia (2019) solve an adaptation-mitigation game and
find that the participation in an environmental agreement can be high provided that countries
cooperate when they decide on their levels of adaptation. The authors analyze two types of
agreements with cooperation in adaptation. A complete agreement where signatory countries
agree to coordinate both their adaptation and mitigation policies, and an adaptation agreement where signatory countries coordinate only their adaptation policies, while each country
decides on emissions individually. In both cases, they consider situations where investments
in adaptation requires a prior commitment. Using numerical simulations, they find that the
agreement that best performs in terms of participation is the adaptation agreement.1 This is
a very interesting result because the literature on technology agreements is not so optimistic
about participation. For instance, Rubio (2017) concludes that for linear damages and quadratic
investment costs, the grand coalition could be stable if marginal damages are large enough to
justify the development of a “breakthrough” technology and technology spillovers are not very
important. When this does not occur, a technology agreement does not perform much better
than an emission agreement.
For this reason, we think that this is an issue that deserves more attention. In this paper,
we analyze the impact that adaptation has on participation when countries decide first on their
1

Masoudi and Zaccour (2017) also find that an adaptation agreement, where countries decide on investment

in adaptation before they select their emissions, can lead to a high level of participation, but they focus on a
type of investment in adaptation that presents imperfect international/public good characteristics.
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levels of adaptation as in Breton and Sbragia’s (2019) paper.This approach has been followed
by others authors as Zehaie (2009), Masoudi and Zaccour (2017), Breton and Sbragia (2017)
for analyzing different issues. In these papers, it is assumed that countries take a decision on
adaptation in anticipation of mitigation policies that imply a commitment on adaptation before
deciding on mitigation.2 Examples of such measures include building infrastructures for water
management (dykes, dams, canal systems), change in land use and housing planning, I&D of
resistant crops and investing to improve forecasting and monitoring. Thus, adaptation can
be interpreted as an investment countries do to avoid or reduce damages coming from future
emissions, and in this case the adaptation stage must occur before the emissions stage. In fact,
we could consider the adaptation stage as an investment stage as done explicitly in Masoudi and
Zaccour (2017) and the adaptation agreement as a technology agreement where the investment
stage comes first than the emission stage.
We use a model with linear damages where the marginal damages represent the vulnerability
of the country to pollution, but what is new in our analysis is that we assume that the investment
in adaptation can reduce the marginal damages, but not bellow a positive lower bound. This
means that we are assuming that adaptation can alleviate the environmental problem, but
cannot solve it taking the marginal damages very close to zero.3 In other words, we suppose
that the degree of the effectiveness of adaptation is bounded from above to eliminate from the
model what we could call an “almost” corner solution. To evaluate the impact of this assumption
in the formation of an international environmental agreement (IEA), we solve an adaptationmitigation game in three stages considering two types of agreements: a complete agreement and
adaptation agreement 4 . For a complete agreement, in the first stage, countries decide on their
participation in the agreemeent. In the second stage, signatory countries decide on their levels
of adaptation as to maximize the agreement net benefits whereas non-signatory countries select
2

Harstad et al. (2019) also assume that countries decide on investment before they select the level of emissions,

but the focus of the paper is on compliance of an IEA in a repeated game framework. The authors distinguish
between adaptation, brown and green technologies and find that the best equilibrium requires countries to
overinvest in technologies that are green, but to underinvest in adaptation and brown technologies.
3
This is a standard assumption in the literature of technology innovation. See for instance Montero (2002).
4
The authors have also analyzed the case when there is no agreement in adaptation investment obtaining the
same result as in the complete agreement. i.e grand coalition is possible but only for extremely high values of
technological effectiveness, otherwise an agreement with only three countries can be stable. Due to the extension
of the analytical analysis this agreement type has not been included to avoid making the paper excessively long.
Nevertheless, analysis is available upon request to the authors.
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their levels of adaptation individually. Finally, in the last stage, acting in the same way countries
decide on emissions. The game is solved by backward induction. However, in the adaptation
agreement there is no cooperation in the third stage, which means that each country decides
noncooperatively its emission levels. One could think that it is not interesting to analyze an
agreement on national goods, but there are two reasons to do it. Firstly, Breton and Sbragia
(2019) include it in their analysis of the impact of adaptation in IEA and we were interested in
knowing which would be the results in our framework. Secondly, as it is assumed that countries
decide on adaptation before deciding on emissions, it is easy to check that the investment in
adaptation indirectly, i.e. through their influence on emissions, creates negative international
externalities. Thus, although adaptation is a national good, because of the timing of the game
the decision on adaptation in the second stage generates indirectly international externalities
through its influence on emissions in the third stage. In this case countries can find profitable
to coordinate their decisions on a national good through an international agreement since the
level of emissions will depend on their decision on adaptation. For this reason, cooperation in
selecting the level of a national good makes sense in this kind of models because adaptation is
decided before countries take their decision on mitigation.
A first thing we would like to highlight from our analysis is that for both types of agreement,
the properties of the adaptation subgame played in the second stage coincide with the properties
of the model without adaptation. Emissions decrease with the number of signatories, the nonsignatories’ net benefits are larger than the signatories’ net benefits for all level of participation,
there are positive spillovers coming from cooperation, i.e. the non-signatories’ net benefits
increase with membership and the difference in net benefits also increases with membership.
Moreover, the two models present the property of full cohesiveness. The unique difference is
that in the model without adaptation, emissions are strategic substitutes, but with adaptation
we find that the levels of adaptation are strategic complements.
The issue of whether the models present strategic substitutes or strategic complements
and how this affects the relationship between emissions and adaptation has been analyzed by
different authors as Zehaie (2009), Marrouch and Ray Chaudhuri (2011), Ebert and Welsch
(2011,2012), Eisenack and Kahler (2016) and Breton and Sbragia (2017). In our model, complementarity is explained by the linearity of the damage function with respect total emissions
that yields an equilibrium in dominant strategies in the third stage of the game. This has two
consequences, first we find a positive relationship between emissions and adaptation in the third
5
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stage of the game, and second we also find a relationship of complementarity between the adaptation of the different countries in the second stage of the game in the two types of agreements
we study in this paper provided that the second order conditions for the maximization of net
benefits are satisfied.
However, it seems that the complementarity does not have a significative influence on the
scope on cooperation. In both cases, the grand coalition can be stable but only for a very high
degree of effectiveness of adaptation. This is our main contribution to this literature. We define
the way to link the effectiveness of adaptation with the level of participation in an IEA and we
find that only for extremely high values of the degree of effectiveness of adaptation the grand
coalition is stable and that if this is not the case the levels of participation are low. For instance,
for the complete agreement the grand coalition is stable for one hundred countries if signatories
are able through investing in adaptation to reduce the marginal damages in a 99.96%. In the case
of an adaptation agreement, the figure is very similar. Thus, if we consider that these figures
are not reasonable, the results are the standard ones. For the complete agreement, only an
agreement consisting of three countries can be stable as occurs in the standard model without
adaptation. For the adaptation agreement, participation can be higher but no agreements
consisting of more than six countries can be stable. Moreover, in this case it is easy to check
that when the degree of effectiveness of adaptation decreases, the participation also decreases.
Thus, for our model we can conclude that adaptation does not promote participation in an IEA.
Another result to highlight, is that damages can increase or decrease when the number of
signatories augments. The reason is that participation reduces total emissions, but, on the
other hand, increases marginal damages because adaptation also decreases with the number
of signatories. We find that if the vulnerability of the country is equal of larger than 0.5,
damages are decreasing with the participation. Bellow this critical value the effect depends on
the parameter values. But, what is clear from our analysis is that an increase in the number
of signatories not necessarily reduces environmental damages. However, this does not modify
the standard result that net benefits both for signatories and non-signatories augment with
cooperation.
Finally, we could point out that the result requiring an extremely high value of the degree
of effectiveness of adaptation or in other words a very low level of vulnerability for the stability
of the grand coalition is consistent with the standard result derived by Barrett (1994) on large
but shallow coalitions, i.e. an IEA will be signed by a lot of countries but only when the IEA
6
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increases global net benefits by very little compared with the fully noncooperative outcome. We
find that when the gains of full cooperation are large, the grand coalition is unstable in both
types of agreements studied in this paper. The majority of countries do not cooperate when
they could obtain large gains from this cooperation, instead only a few number of countries will
sign the agreement in this case. Thus, we find a link between the effectiveness of adaptation
and the degree of cooperation that is consistent with the paradox of cooperation established by
Barrett (1994). We could also offer an alternative interpretation of our results consistent with
the puzzle of small coalitions established by Carraro and Siniscalco (1993). If we assume that
there exists an upper bound for the effectiveness of adaptation that is lower than the threshold
value above which the grand coalition is stable, the only equilibrium for the complete agreement
is an agreement consisting of three countries and for the adaptation agreement the participation
cannot be higher than six countries or lower than three depending of the degree of effectiveness
of adaptation.
It is difficult to compare our analysis with the one developed by Breton and Sbragia (2019)
because the only thing we share with this paper is the timing of the game and that adaptation
is a binding commitment. The two papers use different specifications for the objective function.
Breton and Sbragia’s (2019) objective function is given by the addition of the environmental
damages plus mitigation costs plus adaptation costs all of them being quadratic functions, and
in this paper countries maximize the net benefit of emissions with different specifications of the
benefit and damage functions. The benefit function is linear-quadratic and the damage function
is linear in total emission so that vulnerability in our model is given by the marginal damages
whereas in Breton and Sbragia (2019) is given by the difference between total emissions and
adaptation that is the argument of the damage function. Moreover, they do not impose any
positive lower bound for marginal damages whereas we do. Finally, they solve their model
numerically whereas we solve it analytically. But the main novelty of our analysis is that we
study the relationship between the degree of effectiveness in adaptation and the participation in
an IEA that is not in Breton and Sbragia’ (2019) paper. In both models the grand coalition can
be theoretically stable, but we show that this requires an extremely high degree of effectiveness
in adaptation. In practice, this means that the grand coalition is not an outcome of the game
we should expect if more realistic degrees of effectiveness in adaptation are assumed. Moreover,
if the grand coalition is not an option, the levels of participation are low in the two types of
agreements we study. Thus, we can conclude that for our model adaptation really does not
7
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help to get higher levels of participation in IEAs. However, in Breton and Sbragia (2019) the
participation can be high even if the grand coalition is not stable depending of the parameter
values. They offer a more optimistic results about the role that adaptation plays for promoting
participation than the ones we obtain in this paper. Nevertheless, our conclusion is clear, we may
claim that cooperation in adaptation is not a sufficient condition to obtain more participation
in an environmental agreement. We need something else in the model. Asymmetric knowledge
spillovers as in Masoudi and Zaccour (2017) or maybe high effectiveness of adaptation levels as
in Breton and Sbragia (2019) where the lower bound of marginal damages is zero.

1.1

Literature Review

The stability analysis we present in the next sections enrols in a large strand of literature on the
game-theoretic analysis of international environmental agreements (IEAs) which can be traced
back to the seminal papers by Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett (1994).5 Surprisingly,
in spite of the huge number of paper published on this topic, only a few papers have analyzed
formally the effects of adaptation on the participation in an IEA. This list of papers includes
Barrett (2008), Marrouch and Ray Chaudhuri (2011), Lazkano et al. (2016), Benchekroun et
al. (2017), Bayramoglu et al. (2017, 2018) and Breton and Sbragia (2019). Barrett (2008)
examines a model in which adaptation and mitigation are both binary actions, and where a
subset of poor countries are unable to adapt. His results show that adaptation improves the
prospects for a cooperative agreement but the numerical exercise he develops suggests that this
positive effect is limited when the potential gains from cooperation are large. Marrouch and
Ray Chaudhuri (2011) present a model with linear damages where the non-signatories’ emissions
are strategic complements of signatories’ emissions and the countries decide simultaneously on
their levels of emissions and adaptation. In their model the signatories act as the leader of
the coalition formation game. Using a numerical example, they show that the more effective
the adaptive measure in terms of reducing the marginal damages from emissions, the larger
the stable size of the IEA. Our model is different in several aspects including the damage
function, and analytically concludes that there are only two possible equilibria for the game:
the grand coalition if the degree of effectiveness of adaptation is extremely large or a small
coalition consisting only of three countries for the rest of values of the degree of effectiveness
5

A nice collection of the most influential papers in the field has been published by Finus and Caparrós (2015).

A very complete review of the literature on IEAs can be found in Marrouch and Ray Chaudhuri (2016).
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of adaptation. Moreover, we find that if the gains from full cooperation are large, the grand
coalition is unstable. Lazkano et al. (2016) as Barrett (2008) also look at the effects that
differences in adaptation costs have on participation incentives. They present conditions under
which adaptation can strengthen or weaken free-riding incentives. Benchekroun et al. (2017)
show for a model with a quadratic damage function and identical countries where countries’
emissions are strategic substitutes and both types of countries, signatories and non-signatories
decide simultaneously on the levels of adaptation and emissions that a more efficient adaptation
technology diminishes the incentives of individual countries to free-ride on a global agreement
over emissions. However, they do not clarify whether the grand coalition could be stable.6
Bayramoglu et al.(2017, 2018) claim that if adaptation does that emissions are complements in
the second stage of the game when countries select their level of emissions, adaptation will always
lead to larger stable agreements with lower aggregate emissions and higher global welfare. In
all these models, investment in adaptation is considered a private/national good and countries
select the level of adaptation at the same time they select their levels of emissions or after this
decision has been taken.7 In our model, we focus on investment in adaptation involving longterm planning. For this kind of investments, countries must act in anticipation of mitigation
policies. Moreover, our results are somewhat more pessimistic.
As far as we know, the unique paper that addresses the stability of an adaptation agreement when the level of adaptation is selected before emissions, and adaptation is considered
a private/national good is Breton and Sbragia (2019). Breton and Sbragia’s (2019) numerical simulations shows that the cooperation in adaptation can boost participation. Even the
grand coalition can be stable for some parameter values as occurs in our investigation. We also
addresses this issue, but for a different specification of the net benefit function, obtaining a different result on participation as we have just explained above because our assumption about the
upper limit that the degree of effectiveness of adaptation can take. We show analytically that
the participation cannot be higher than three countries for the complete agreement although
could reach six countries for the case of the adaptation agreement.
6

Li and Rus (2019) extend this model for heterogeneous countries showing that technological progress in

adaptation can foster an IEA. They use a numerical example with parameters estimated from climate change
data.
7
Masoudi and Zaccour (2018) analyze the stability of a complete agreement on investment in adaptation and
emissions where countries decide simultaneously on the levels of these two variables. However, they assume as in
Masoudi and Zaccour (2017) that investment in adaptation is an imperfect global public good.
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To end this review of the literature, we would like to add that besides the investment in
adaptation other papers have studied the impact of investment in green technologies that reduces
the abatement costs on the stability of IEAs. Among other papers, we could mention those
published by Barrett (2006), Hoel and de Zeeuw (2010), Harstad (2012, 2016), Hong and Karp
(2012), El-Sayed and Rubio (2014), Helm and Schmidt (2015), Battaglini and Harstad (2016),
Goeschl and Perino (2017), Rubio (2017) and Harstad et al. (2019). One of the issues examined
by this literature is to know whether a technology agreement could be a good alternative to
an emission agreement. From this list, we would like to highlight the paper by El-Sayed and
Rubio (2014). In their analysis, it is assumed that signatories not only coordinate their levels of
investment but also pool them so as to fully internalize the spillover effects of their investments,
i.e. investment is considered as a club good. However, the results show, that even assuming a
strong asymmetry between signatories and non-signatories as regards the effective investment,
the participation in the technology agreement is low. Interestingly, the maximum level of
participation consists of six countries.8
The paper is organized in four sections. In the next section, Section 2, we present the model
and in Section 3 we analyze the scope of cooperation in a complete agreement. Section 4 analyzes
the case of an adaptation agreement, and Section 5 closes the paper with the conclusions and
the presentation of different issues for future research.

2

The model

We consider a model with N countries where each country emits a global pollutant as a result
of its consumption and production activities. We let ei stand for the emission level of country
PN
i where i = 1, ..., N, and E =
i=1 ei are total emissions. While total emissions damage
all countries, each country can reduce the negative effects of pollution by mitigation and/or
investing in adaptation. Let ai represent the adaptation level of country i. A key difference
in our paper between emissions and adaptation lies in the international public good nature of
8

We would like to quote also the paper by Caparrós (2018). This author shows that short-term agreements

following an incomplete long-term agreement, as the Paris Agreement, cannot achieve the first best solution but
it can improve upon the situation without a long-term agreement. In his model, countries invest to reduce the
abatement costs after the long-term agreement is signed but before the state of nature that determines the benefit
of total abatement is realized.

10
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pollution and the national private good nature of adaptation.9 While each country’s emissions
are a national decision, pollution is a global public bad that creates free-riding incentives on
emission abatement. Instead, adaptation is a national decision with country-specific benefits
and costs.
Each country’s net benefits consists of benefits from pollution activities minus emission
damages and adaptation costs. Global pollution damages all countries, however each country
has the option to offset damages through adaptation. Country i0 s benefits from emissions are

B(ei ) = αei −

γ 2
e , α, γ > 0,
2 i

and the damage function is10
D(ai , E) = (d − ai )E, d > ai > 0.
As usual we assume that environmental damages cannot be completely eliminated through
adaptation. The cost of reducing the marginal damages is increasing and is given by C(ai ) =
ca2i /2, c > 0.11 Thus, the net benefit for country i are

Wi (ai , ei , E−i ) = αei −
where E−i =

3

c
γ 2
ei − (d − ai )(ei + E−i ) − a2i ,
2
2

(1)

P

j6=i ej .

A complete agreement formation game

The formation of an IEA is modeled as a three-stage game. Each stage will be now described
briefly in reverse order as the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game is computed by backward
9

One might argue that adaptation could also have an international dimension. We abstract from this possibility

because our aim in this paper is to study how country incentives to participate in an IEA change when national
adaptation is available. See Masoudi and Zaccour (2017,2018), for the analysis of international cooperation when
adaptation presents an imperfect international public good characteristic.
10
This specification of the damage function is based on the one proposed by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988)
to study the effects of R&D on the cooperation in a duopolistic market. Since then it has been intensively used
in the IO literature. The authors represent the R&D variable as a reduction in the marginal cost of production.
Lazkano el al. (2016) have used it to analyze the consequences that differences in adaptation costs have on the
incentives to participate in an IEA. We assume that the slope of the benefit function is the unity. However, this
assumption has no qualitative effects on the results obtained in this paper.
11
Notice that the marginal cost is increasing indicating that the resources invested to reduce damages present
decreasing returns.
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induction.
Given the participation in the agreement and the investment in adaptation of all countries,
in the third stage, the emission subgame, signatory countries choose their emissions so as to
maximize the agreement net benefits taking as given non-signatories’ emissions. Non-signatories
choose the level of emissions acting non-cooperatively and taking the emissions of all other countries as given in order to maximize their national net benefits. Signatories and non-signatories
choose emissions levels simultaneously. Thus, emissions are provided by the partial agreement
Nash equilibrium (PANE) with respect to a coalition defined by Chander and Tulkens (1995).
In the second stage, the adaptation subgame, countries act as in the third stage, but now they
decide on investment in adaptation. Finally, it is assumed that in the first stage countries play
a simultaneous open membership game with a single binding agreement. In a single agreement
formation game, the strategies for each country are to sign or not to sign and the agreement
is formed by all players who have chosen to sign. Under open membership, any country is
free to join the agreement. Lastly, we assume that the signing of the agreement is binding on
signatories. The game finishes when the emission subgame is over.12

3.1

The third stage: an equilibrium in dominant strategies

As we have supposed that non-signatories countries do not cooperate in the third stage, optimal
emissions can be calculated by maximizing (1) given that participation is decided in the first
stage and adaptation in the second stage.
The first-order condition (FOC) for an interior solution are

α − γefi = d − afi , i = 1, ..., N − n,

(2)

where f stands for a non-signatory countries and n represents the number of signatories so that
N − n is the number of non-signatories. This condition establishes that the marginal benefits
of emissions must be equal to the national marginal damages. Thus, non-signatories only take
12

As countries that cooperate in the second stage are the same countries that cooperate in the third stage,

we could obtain the same solution than the one we derive in this section modeling the IEA formation game as
a two-stage game with countries deciding on emissions and adaptation at the same time in the second stage.
However, we have decided to keep this structure for the game because it facilities the analysis of the adaptation
agreement we present in the second part of the paper where countries do not cooperate when they decide on
emissions.

12
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into account the effect that emissions have on its national damages.
Then, emission are given by

efi =

α − d afi
+ .
γ
γ

(3)

Notice that an increase in adaptation leads to higher emissions.
On the other hand, signatories choose the level of emissions to maximize the agreement net
benefits taking as given the non-signatories’ adaptation
n n
X
γ s 2
c s 2o
s
s
s
max WA =
αej − (ej ) − (d − aj )(ej + E−j ) − (aj ) ,
2
2
{es1 ,...,esn }
j=1

where s stands for a signatory country. The FOCs for this problem are
α − γesj =

n
X

(d − ask ) = nd − As , j = 1, ..., n,

(4)

k=1

where As =

Pn

s
k=1 ak .

As in condition (2), the LHS is the marginal benefit of emissions. However, the signatories
take into account the increase in damages for the rest of signatories caused by the increase in
its own emissions.
Thus emissions for signatories are given by
esj =

α − nd As
+
.
γ
γ

(5)

Emissions increase with adaptation, but in this case signatories’ emissions depend on the total
adaptation of signatory countries. Moreover, it is clear that all signatories will choose the same
level of emissions.
As environmental damages are linear, the countries’ reaction functions for emissions are
orthogonal for both signatories and non-signatories, and the optimal emissions are given by an
equilibrium in dominant strategies.
Using (3) and (5) we obtain the following expression for total emissions
E=

N
−n
X
i=1

where Af =

PN −n
i=1

efi

+

n
X

esj =

j=1

1
(N α − (N − n + n2 )d + Af + nAs ),
γ

(6)

afi .

Next, using (1), net benefits can be written as follows for non-signatories

13
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Wif =

α
1
c
(α − d + afi ) −
(α − d + afi )2 − (d − afi )E − (afi )2 , i = 1, ..., N − n,
γ
2γ
2

(7)

and as follows for signatories
Wjs =

1
c
α
(α − nd + As ) −
(α − nd + As )2 − (d − asj )E − (asj )2 , j = 1, ..., n,
γ
2γ
2

(8)

where total emissions are given by (6).
Observe that although the investment in adaptation is a national good, if countries decide
on adaptation before they select the level of emissions, the investment in adaptation generates
indirectly international externalities as the following derivatives show
∂Wjs
∂Wif
1
n
f n
=
−(d−a
)
<
0,
= (−As +asj n) = (asj −ās ), j, k = 1, ..., n, j 6= k, i = 1, ..., N −n,
i
s
s
∂aj
γ
∂ak
γ
γ
(9)
f
∂Wjs
∂W
1
1
i
= −(d − afi ) < 0, i, l = 1, ..., N − n, i 6= l, j = 1, ..., n, (10)
= −(d − asj ) < 0,
γ
γ
∂afi
∂af
l

where

ās

3.2

The second stage: the PANE of the adaptation game

is the average of the distribution of signatories’ adaptation.

In this subsection, we solve stage two assuming that in the first stage n countries, with n ≥ 1,
have signed the agreement.13 Each non-signatory country chooses its level of adaptation as to
maximize (7) taking as given the other countries’ adaptation levels.
The FOCs for non-signatories are

E = cafi , i = 1, ..., N − n,

(11)

where the LHS stands for the marginal benefit of adaptation given by the reduction in damages
because the decrease in the marginal damages caused by adaptation that in our model is given
by total emissions, and the RHS stands for the marginal costs of adaptation. Taking into
account (6), the condition (11) implicitly defines the non-signatory reaction function. Applying
the implicit function theorem we obtain that
∂afi
∂afl
13

=−

1
, i, l = 1, ..., N − n, i 6= l,
1 − γc

∂afi
n
=−
, j = 1, ..., n.
s
∂aj
1 − γc

If n = 1, no agreement is signed and the outcome of the game is the fully non-cooperative equilibrium. If

n = N, the agreement is the grand coalition and the efficient solution is implemented by the agreement.

14
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The second order condition (SOC) for the maximization of net benefits requires that γc > 1
and consequently the adaptation of a non-signatory is a strategic complement of the rest of
countries’ adaptation.
On the other hand, signatories choose the level of adaptation to maximize the agreement net
benefits taking as given the non-signatories’ adaptation. If we focus on the symmetric solution,
according to (9), we have that ∂Wjs /∂ask = 0. In this case, the FOC for the maximization of the
agreement net benefits is

n

α 1
∂E
− (α − nd + nas )n + E − (d − as ) s − cas = 0,
γ
γ
∂a

that taking into account that for the symmetric solution ∂E/∂as is equal to n2 /γ yields
n

α 1
n2
− (α − nd + nas )n − (d − as ) + E − cas = 0,
γ
γ
γ

where the the first three terms cancel according to the FOC (4) of the third stage yielding
finally the following condition

E = cas .

(12)

This condition implicitly defines the reaction function of the representative signatory. Applying the implicit function theorem again, we obtain that
∂as
∂afi

=−

n2

1
, i = 1, ..., N − n.
− γc

For the maximization of the agreement net benefits, the SOC is γc > n2 what establishes that
the signatory’s adaptation is a strategic complement of the non-signatories’ adaptation. As
n ∈ [1, N ], we assume that γc > N 2 that guarantees that SOC are satisfied for both signatories
and non-signatories regardless of the level of participation in the agreement for N > 2.This
condition acts a concavity requirement for each signatory: in the sense that it establishes a
lower bound on the values of the concavity coefficients within the emission and adaptation net
benefit functions such that these are strictly concave for any possible value of participation
n ∈ [1, N ].
Conditions (11) and (12) establish that both signatories and non-signatories choose the same
level of adaptation that is given by
a=

N α − (n2 − n + N )d
,
γc − (n2 − n + N )

(13)
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and multiplying by c would obtain total emissions. Substituting this expression in (3) and (5)
allows us to calculate emissions
ef =

γc(α − d) − n(n − 1)α
γc(α − nd) + α(N − n)(n − 1)
, es =
.
2
γ(γc − (n − n + N ))
γ(γc − (n2 − n + N ))

(14)

Observe that if γc > N 2 the denominator of these expression is positive for all n ∈ [1, N ].
On the other hand, as n2 − n + N increases with n, α/N > d will give a positive numerator for
a for all n ∈ [2, N ]. If adaptation is positive this condition also guarantees that emissions are
positive for both signatories and non-signatories according conditions (3) and (5). Moreover,
using these conditions we obtain that
ef − es =

1
(n − 1)(d − a),
γ

and we can conclude that if marginal damages are positive the non-signatories’ emissions are
larger than the signatories’ emissions for all levels of cooperation. Using (13) marginal damages
can be written as follows

d−a=

γcd − N α
.
γc − (n2 − n + N )

(15)

Given this expression, c > αN/dγ guarantees that there is no over-adaptation. However, when
c is close to this lower bound we will have what we could call an “almost” corner solution with
marginal damages close to zero. The investment in adaptation is boosted by low adaptation
costs leading the marginal damages close to zero. We think that this is a very optimistic
assumption about what we can expect from adaptation. To avoid this kind of solutions we are
going to introduce a lower bound on marginal damages larger than zero. We will assume that
marginal damages with adaptation cannot be lower than a fraction β ∈ (0, 1) of the marginal
damages without adaptation. In this case, we require that
(1 − β)d − a =

(1 − β)dγc − N α + βd(n2 − n + N )
≥ 0,
γc − (n2 − n + N )

that imposes a lower bound on d
d≥

Nα
.
(1 − β)γc + β(n2 − n + N )

This lower bound on d is simply a minimum distance requirement between d and a, which means
that as mentioned above, we impose a minimum vulnerability given that we assume marginal
damages with adaptation cannot be lower than a fraction β ∈ (0, 1) of the marginal damages
16
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without adaptation.
The RHS of this inequality is decreasing with respect to n. Thus, it takes its highest value for
n=1
d≥

Nα
.
(1 − β)γc + βN

But this lower bound must be compatible with the upper bound for d, α/N, defined above that
requires that

γc >

N 2 − βN
> N 2 for β ∈ (0, 1).
1−β

We can summarize all these conditions in the following assumption14
Assumption 1 We assume that N 2 < (N 2 − βN )/(1 − β) < γc and d ∈ [αN/(γc(1 − β) +
βN ), α/N ) for β ∈ (0, 1).
Thus, this assumption guarantees that the non-negativity constraints are satisfied, that
marginal damages are higher than a positive lower bound and that the SOC are also satisfied.
These parameter restrictions simply enforce the technological requirements assumed in our
model. For example, no over adaptation parameter constraint ensures that countries will not
consider selecting a level of adaptation above d, which would convert environmental damages
into environmental benefits of pollution. This is just a consistency requirement which translates
real world characteristics to an a priori unrestricted initial model. Therefore the feasible set on
parameter values derived here simply ensures that through their net benefit functions, countries
will be aware of and will act consistently with the real world assumptions we impose into the
model.
Notice that 1 − β defines de degree of effectiveness of adaptation since multiplying by one
hundred we would obtain the percentage reduction in marginal damages because of the investment in adaptation. In the next subsection, we will study how the level of participation
in an IEA depends on this parameter. As in this model, the marginal damages represent the
vulnerability of the country to total emissions, we could interpret β as a measure of the country’s vulnerability, so that the higher the degree of effectiveness of adaptation, the lower the
vulnerability.
Next, we compare net benefits. The non-signatories pollute more than signatories and invest
the same in adaptation than signatories, consequently their net benefits are higher than the net
14

Notice thtat (N 2 − βN )/(1 − β) is an increasing strictly convex function of β.
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benefits signatories get. On the other hand, it is easy to check that adaptation for both nonsignatories and signatories decreases as the number of signatories increases. Thus, cooperation
decreases both adaptation and emissions because emissions depend positively on adaptation.
The same occurs with total emissions. Now, if we look at net benefits, we know that benefits
and adaptation costs are going to decrease with an increase on participation. However, it is not
so clear what occurs with damages. On one hand, marginal damages increase because of the
reduction in adaptation. On the other hand, total emissions decrease with cooperation. Next,
we evaluate how damages change with the participation. Damages are given by the following
expression
D(n) = (d − a)E =

c(γcd − N α)(N α − (n2 + N − n)d)
,
(γc − (n2 + N − n))2

where γcd − N α is positive according to Assumption 1. The first derivative with respect to n is
∂D(n)
2N α − (γc + n2 + N − n)d
.
= c(dγc − N α)(2n − 1)
∂n
(γc − (n2 + N − n))3

(16)

Thus, the sign of this first derivative depends on the sign of the numerator. As the numerator
decreases with n, we can define two threshold values for d
d1 = d(n = N ) =

2N α
2N α
< d2 = d(n = 1) =
,
2
γc + N
γc + N

such that if d < d1 damages are increasing for all n ∈ [1, N ] provided that d1 > αN/(γc(1 −
β) + βN ), and if d > d2 damages are decreasing for all n ∈ [1, N ] provided that d2 < α/N. For
d in the interval (d1 , d2 ) there will exist a critical value n∗ defined by ∂D/∂n = 0, so that for
n < n∗ damages are increasing and for n > n∗ damages decrease. Next, we investigate when
damages are increasing comparing d1 with the bounds for d defined in Assumption 1.
α(γc − N 2 )
N 2 − βN
α
− d1 =
> 0 for γc >
,
2
N
N (γc + N )
1−β
d1 −

αN
N α ((1 − 2β)γc − (N − 2β)N )
=
.
γc(1 − β) + βN
(γc + N 2 )(γc(1 − β) + βN )

The numerator of this expression is negative for all γc > 0 if β ≥ 1/2. However, if β < 1/2 then
there exists a threshold value (γc)0 equal to (N − 2β)N/(1 − 2β) > (N 2 − βN )/(1 − β) such
that










>
>






if γc
(γc)0 then d1
=
=








 < 

 <







αN
,

γc(1 − β) + βN




and we can conclude that
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Proposition 1 If β < 1/2 and γc > (γc)0 = (N − 2β)N/(1 − 2β) then d1 ∈ (αN/(γc(1 −
β) + βN ), α/N ) and damages are increasing with the participation for all n ∈ [1, N ] when
d ∈ [αN/(γc(1 − β) + βN ), d1 ).
Thus, damages can increase with participation if the country’s vulnerability is low. In
this case, the increase in marginal damages because the reduction of adaptation when the
participation steps up is strong enough as to compensate the reduction in damages because the
reduction in total emissions yielding that an increase in participation leads to an increase in
damages.
Next, we compare d2 with the bounds for d defined in Assumption 1
d2 −

αN
N α(γc − N )(1 − 2β)
=
.
γc(1 − β) + βN
(γc + N )(γc(1 − β) + βN )

This difference is negative for all γc > N if β > 1/2 which implies that d2 is also lower than
α/N. For β < 1/2 we need to compare d2 with α/N.

α −2N 2 + N + γc
α
− d2 =
.
N
N (γc + N )
This difference is zero for the threshold value (γc)00 = 2N 2 − N > (N 2 − βN )/(1 − β) so that












>
>








α
00
if γc
(γc) then
d2 ,
=
=



N








 < 
 < 
and we can conclude that
Proposition 2 If β ≥ 1/2 then damages are decreasing with the participation for all n ∈ [1, N ]
and all d ∈ [αN/(γc(1 − β) + βN ), α/N ). If β < 1/2 and γc > (γc)00 = N (2N − 1) then
d2 ∈ (αN/(γc(1 − β) + βN ), α/N ) and damages are decreasing with the participation for all
n ∈ [1, N ] when d ∈ (d2 , α/N ).
Thus, damages decrease if the country’s vulnerability is high for all values of d, although they
could also decrease if the vulnerability is low, but then damages and the product γc must be
high. In this case, although the marginal damages increase with the participation, the reduction
in total emissions is strong enough as to cause a reduction in total damages. In the rest of cases
that are not included in the previous propositions, there will exist a critical value n∗ ∈ [2, N ],
so that for n < n∗ damages are increasing and for n > n∗ damages decrease.
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However, regardless of whether damages increase or decrease with cooperation, cooperation
has a positive effect on net benefit for both non-signatories and signatories. Signatories internalize the negative externality caused by pollution and as a result of this, the net benefits
increase monotonically with membership.
Taking the first derivative of net benefits with respect to n for signatories yields
∂W s
∂es
∂es ∂as
∂E
∂as
=α
− γes
+
E − (d − as )
− cas
,
∂n
∂n
∂n
∂n
∂n
∂n

(17)

that considering that
∂E
∂es
∂ef
= es + n
− ef + (N − n)
,
∂n
∂n
∂n

(18)

can be rewritten as follows


s
∂W s
∂es
∂ef
s
s ∂a
s
s
f
,
= (α − γes − n(d − a ))
+ (E − ca )
− (d − a ) e − e + (N − n)
∂n
∂n
∂n
∂n
where the first term of the RHS is zero according to FOC (4) and E = cas according to (12)
resulting in


∂W s
∂ef
s
f
s
= (d − a ) e − e − (N − n)
> 0,
∂n
∂n

(19)

since ef > es and non-signatories’ emissions decrease with the cooperation.
For non-signatories, we obtain the following expression
∂ef
∂af
∂es
∂ef
∂W f
= (α − γef − (d − af ))
+ (E − caf )
− (d − af )(es + n
− ef + (N − n − 1)
),
∂n
∂n
∂n
∂n
∂n
where again the first term is zero by the FOCs of the third stage and E = caf according to (11).
Thus, we obtain the following expression
∂W f
∂es
∂ef
= (d − af )(ef − es − n
− (N − n − 1)
) > 0.
∂n
∂n
∂n

(20)

Thus, we find that there are positive spillovers for non-signatories stemming from cooperation, i.e. cooperation increases the non-signatories’ net benefits. Moreover, it is easy to show
that the difference in net benefits also increases with the participation. Lastly, we show that the
game presents the property of full cohesiveness.15 This property states that total net benefits increase when the coalition is enlarged gradually and obtains its maximum for the grand coalition.
This property justifies the search for large stable agreements. For this reason, it deserves some
discussion. If we look at the expression of total net benefits W = nW s (n) + (N − n)W f (n) we
15

These two properties are showed in the Appendix.
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have that the increase in participation is driving by three variations as the following derivative
shows
∂W
∂W s (n)
∂W f (n)
= W s (n) − W f (n) + n
+ (N − n)
,
∂n
∂n
∂n
where the first term is negative and the other two terms positive as we have just showed, thus
the effect of an increase in the number of signatories could be negative or positive depending
of the magnitude of each term in the expression. Our analysis shows that the addition of the
two last terms is greater than the difference in net benefits that represents the first term for all
levels of cooperation. This term is negative because we have showed that signatories obtain a
lower net benefit of non-signatories whatever is the number of signatories. It is important to
highlight the role that the positive spillovers of cooperation has on this result since it reinforces
the positive effect that an increase in participation has on signatories’ net benefits resulting
finally in an increase of the aggregate net benefits for all levels of cooperation. Thus, we can
conclude that this result is not an artifact of the adaptation-emissions game we analyze in the
paper, but a feature that characterizes the PANE of the second stage of the game. To end
this subsection we would like to point out that all these features of the PANE of the second
stage already appear in the model without adaptation. In other words, the introduction of
adaptation does not modify the features of the PANE of the second stage of the model without
adaptation except in one point, whereas emissions are strategic substitutes in the model without
adaptation, investment in adaptation are strategic complements in our model with adaptation.

3.3

The first stage: the Nash equilibrium of the membership game

In this subsection, we investigate which is the level of participation that can be achieved with
a complete agreement that includes cooperation on the levels of adaptation. First, we present
the definition of coalition stability from d’Aspremont et al. (1983), which has been extensively
used in the literature on international environmental agreements.
Definition 1 An agreement consisting of n signatories is stable if Wks (n) ≥ Wkf (n − 1) for
k = 1, ..., n and Wjf (n) ≥ Wjs (n + 1) for j = 1, ..., N − n.
The first inequality, which is also known as the internal stability condition, simply means
that any signatory country is at least as well-off staying in the agreement as withdrawing from it,
assuming that all other countries do not change their membership status. The second inequality,
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which is also known as the external stability condition, similarly requires any non-signatory to
be at least as well-off remaining as a non-signatory that joining the agreement, assuming once
again, that all other countries do not change their membership status. In order to develop the
stability analysis we define the stability function S(n) = W s (n) − W f (n − 1). Notice that if
S(n) is positive and S(n + 1) is negative an agreement consisting of n countries is stable and
the stability analysis can be reduced to find out whether S(n) = 0 has a solution that satisfies
the stability conditions.16
For our model, the stability function S(n) reads as follows

S(n) =

(n − 1)(γcd − αN )2 F (n)
,
2γ(γc − ((n − 1)2 + N − n + 1))2 (γc − (n2 + N − n))2

(21)

where the denominator is positive and F (n) is a polynomial of fifth degree

F (n) = −n5 + 5n4 + f3 n3 − f2 n2 − f1 n + f0 ,

(22)

with
f3 = 2γc − 2N − 7 > 0,
f2 = 8γc − 4N − 3 > 0,
f1 = (γc)2 − 2(N + 3)γc + (N − 2)N > 0,
f0 = 3(γc)2 − 2(N + 2)γc − N 2 > 0,
for N ≥ 3 provided that γc > N 2 . Analyzing this polynomial, we can conclude that
Proposition 3 For interior solutions and N ≥ 7, if the degree of effectiveness of adaptation
1 − β is larger or equal to (N 2 − 3N )/(N 2 − 3N + 4) the grand coalition is stable. However, if it
is lower than this threshold value the only stable agreement consists of three countries regardless
of the severity of environmental damages provided that γc ≥ max[(N 2 + 3N )/(N − 1), (N 2 −
βN )/(1 − β)].
Proof. See Appendix A.3
This result establishes that incorporating the investment in adaptation to an agreement on
emissions, the grand coalition could be stable. However, the limit of the lower bound for the
16

Notice that this implies that S 0 (n∗ ) must be negative where n∗ is the solution for S(n) = 0. If n∗ is not a

natural number, the stable agreement is given by the first natural number on the left of n∗ provided that for the
first natural number on the right of n∗ , S(n) is negative.
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effectiveness of adaptation that defines the interval for this variable for which the grand coalition
is stable converges to one very quickly with the number of countries involved in the international
environmental problem. For instance, for N = 10, the lower bound for the effectiveness of
adaptation is 1 − β = 0.9459 that means that the grand coalition through the investment in
adaptation is able to reduce the marginal damages in a 94.59%, leading the vulnerability of the
country to 0.0541. For N = 100, we have that the lower bound is 1 − β = 0.9996 that reduces
the vulnerability to 0.0004. We believe that this is a very optimistic assumption about we can
expect from the investment in adaptation. In fact, it implies that the environmental problem
could be solved by investing in adaptation. Thus, the answer to the question in the title of this
paper is that we cannot expect that adaptation promotes the participation in an IEA under
reasonable assumptions about the degree of effectiveness of adaptation.
If the effectiveness of adaptation is not extremely high, the gains from cooperation will be
low because only three countries will sign the agreement. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to
investigate whether our result requiring low vulnerability for the stability of the grand coalition
is consistent with the ‘paradox of cooperation’ that establishes that cooperation appears when
we do not need it because the gains of cooperation are low. To address this issue we calculate
using expressions (7) and (8) the gains of full cooperation

W s (N ) − W f (1) =

c(γcd − N α)2 (N − 1)2
> 0,
2(γc − N 2 )(γc − N )2

(23)

that are positive since according to Assumption 1 cγ > N 2 . From the proof of Prop. 3 we know
that for a given value of γ, the grand coalition will be stable if c is lower than

N2
γ

+

4(N −1)
γ(N −3) .

In

other words, we can define an upper bound on c such that if c is larger than this upper bound,
the grand coalition is unstable. Thus, if we show that the gains coming from full cooperation
increase with respect to c we could conclude that for c larger than the upper bound defined
above, the grand coalition yields larger gains but is then unstable.
To find the effect that an increase in c has on the difference (23), we calculate the first
derivative with respect to this parameter that gives the following expression
N (γc − N )G(γc)
∂(W s (N ) − W f (1))
=
,
3
∂c
((γc) − N (N + 2)(γc)2 + N 2 (2N + 1)γc − N 4 )2

(24)

where
G(γc) = G1 (γc)3 + G2 (γc)2 + G3 γc + N 4 α2 ,
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with
G1 = d(2α − (N + 2)d) > 0,
G2 = N (3N d2 + 2dα − 2α2 ) < 0,
G3 = N 3 α(α − 4d) > 0,
N > 4 provided that d < α/N according to Assumption 1. As the coefficients of the polynomial
G(γc) in the numerator change their signs twice, we can conclude according to Descartes’ rule
of signs that the polynomial equation could have a maximum of two positive roots. Moreover,
as the independent term is positive if the polynomial equation has two roots, the polynomial
must be positive for values of γc lower than the smallest root and higher than the largest root
and negative between the two roots. In fact, it is easy to check that this is the case since for
γc = N 2 ,the polynomial yields a negative value:G(N 2 ) = −N 4 (α − N d)2 (N − 1), so that we
can conclude that the smallest root is lower than N 2 and the largest root is higher than N 2 . It
is also easy to check by substitution that the largest root is γc = αN/d. Then as γcmust be
higher than αN/dfor having a positive marginal damage, we have that G(γc) is positive for all
γc > αN/dwhat implies that the derivative (24) is positive and we can conclude that the gains
of full cooperation increase with c and that for c >

N2
γ

+

4(N −1)
γ(N −3) ,

countries would obtain more

gains from full cooperation but then the agreement would be unstable.

4

An adaptation agreement formation game

In this section we focus on an agreement on investment in adaptation. As we have assumed that
the investment in adaptation is a national good, we could think that this kind of agreements have
no influence in the national decisions because there are not international spillovers. However, if
the countries decide on adaptation before they choose their levels of emissions, the investment
in adaptation will affect the net benefits of the rest of countries through the influence that
adaptation has on emissions. The formation of an adaptation agreement is also modeled as a
three-stage game as in the case of a complete agreement with the difference that there is no
cooperation in the third stage.

4.1

The third stage: an equilibrium in dominant strategies

Without cooperation in the third stage, the FOCs for an interior solution are given by (2)
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α − γei = d − ai , i = 1, ..., N.

(25)

As there is no cooperation in this stage, all countries only take into account the effect that
emissions have on its national damages.
Thus, emission are given by

ei =

1
(α − d + ai ).
γ

(26)

As environmental damages are linear, the countries’ reaction functions are orthogonal and the
optimal emissions are given by an equilibrium in dominant strategies. Notice that as in the
complete agreement an increase in adaptation leads to higher emissions.
Adding for all countries allows us to calculate total emissions

E=
where A =

PN

i=1 ai

N (α − d) + A
,
γ

(27)

is total investment in adaptation.

Next, using (1), net benefits can be written as follows

Wi =

α
1
c
(α − d + ai ) −
(α − d + ai )2 − (d − ai )E − (ai )2 ,
γ
2γ
2

(28)

where total emissions are given by (27).
Observe that although the investment in adaptation is a national good, if countries decide
on adaptation before they select the level of emissions, the investment in adaptation generates
negative international externalities as the following derivative shows
∂Wi
1
= − (d − ai ) < 0, i, j = 1, ..., N, i 6= j.
∂aj
γ

4.2

(29)

The second stage: the PANE of the adaptation game

In this subsection, we solve stage two assuming that in the first stage n countries have signed
the agreement. Thus, in this stage we have to distinguish between non-signatory countries and
signatory countries. Notice that as total emissions are positively related to total adaptation,
this variable can be seen as a global public bad like total emissions.
The FOCs for non-signatories are
d − afi
α 1
N (α − d) + A
− (α − d + afi ) +
=
+ cafi ,
γ
γ
γ
γ

(30)

25

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2021

27

Submission to Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers

where

A=

N
−n
X

afi +

i=1

n
X

asj ,

j=1

However, as expected if we take into account the FOCs of the third stage, (30) simplifies yielding

E=

N (α − d) + A
= cafi ,
γ

(31)

where the LHS stands for the marginal benefit of adaptation given by the reduction in damages
because the decrease in the marginal damages caused by adaptation and the RHS stands for
the marginal costs of adaptation. Thus, there are no differences with the FOCs obtained for
non-signatories in the case of a complete agreement.
On the other hand, signatories choose the level of adaptation to maximize the agreement
net benefits taking as given the non-signatories’ adaptation.

max WA =
s

{a1 ,...,asn }

n 
X
α
j=1

γ

(α − d + asj ) −


1
N (α − d) + A
c
(α − d + asj )2 − (d − asj )(
) − a2j .
2γ
γ
2

Looking for the symmetric solution, the FOC gives
α 1
N (α − d) + A
n
− (α − d + as ) +
= (d − as ) + cas ,
γ
γ
γ
γ
that taking into account the FOC of the first stage yields

E=

(n − 1)
N (α − d) + A
=
(d − as ) + cas ,
γ
γ

(32)

where the LHS is, as in condition (31), the marginal benefit of adaptation. However, the
signatories take into account the increase in damages for the rest of signatories caused by the
increase in adaptation. Remember that adaptation increases national emissions. This condition
implicitly defines the reaction function of the representative signatory. Applying the implicit
function theorem again, we obtain that
∂as
∂afi

=

1
, i = 1, ..., N − n.
γc + 1 − 2n

For signatories, the SOC requires that γc > 2n − 1 what establishes that the signatory’s adaptation is a strategic complement of the non-signatories’ adaptation. As n ∈ [1, N ], we assume that
26
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γc > 2N − 1 that guarantees that SOC for both signatories and non-signatories are satisfied
regardless of the level of participation in the agreement for N > 2.
Thus, using (31) and (32), we may obtain the level of adaptation of the Partial Agreement
Nash Equilibrium (PANE) of the second stage
γcαN + ((N − n)(n − 1) − γc(N + n − 1))d
,
(γc)2 − (N + n − 1)γc + (n − 1)(N − n)
α(γc − n + 1)N + ((N − n)(n − 1) − γcN )d
.
af =
(γc)2 − (N + n − 1)γc + (n − 1)(N − n)
as =

(33)
(34)

It is easy to show that denominator of both expressions is positive for all n ∈ [1, N ] if
γc > 2N − 1, and that the numerator of (33) is also positive provided that αN/(2N − 1) > d.17
Thus, these two constraints on parameter values guarantee that as is positive for all n ∈ [1, N ]
and also that es is positive since αN/(2N − 1) > d implies that α > d.
Next, we verify if the marginal damages are positive

d − as =

(γc)2

γc(γcd − αN )
.
− (N + n − 1)γc + (n − 1)(N − n)

(35)

Given this expression, d > αN/(γc) guarantees that there is no over-adaptation. This condition
also guarantees that af is larger than as , that ef is positive and obviously larger than es , and
that marginal damages for non-signatories are also positive.
d − af =

(γc)2

(γc − n + 1)(γcd − αN )
.
− (N + n − 1)γc + (n − 1)(N − n)

(36)

Now, using (33) and (34) we can calculate the emissions for each type of country
es =

1 (γc − N )α + (α − d)(γc)2 − (γc − 1 − N )αn − αn2
,
γ
(γc)2 − (N + n − 1)γc + (n − 1)(N − n)

(37)

1 γc(α − d)(1 + γc) + (α − γc(α − d))n − αn2
,
γ (γc)2 − (N + n − 1)γc + (n − 1)(N − n)

(38)

ef =

and adding for all countries we obtain total emissions
E = nes + (N − n)ef =

c(N (1 + γc)(α − d) + (d − N (α − d))n − dn2 )
.
(γc)2 − (N + n − 1)γc + (n − 1)(N − n)

(39)

As in the previous section, we will assume that marginal damages with adaptation cannot
be lower than a fraction β ∈ (0, 1) of the marginal damages without adaptation. If we impose
this constraint on the non-signatories, it will also be satisfied for signatories since af > as .
(1 − β)d − af =
17

(γc − n + 1)(γcd − αN ) − βd((γc)2 − (N + n − 1)γc + (n − 1)(N − n))
≥ 0,
(γc)2 − (N + n − 1)γc + (n − 1)(N − n)

Notice that the numerator is decreasing in n.
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that imposes a lower bound on d

d≥

(γc − n + 1)αN
.
(1 − β)(γc)2 + (βN − (1 − β)(n − 1))γc − β(n − 1)(N − n)

The RHS of the inequality is decreasing with n. Thus, it takes the highest value for n = 1
d≥

αN
,
γc(1 − β) + βN

which is the same constraint we obtain for the complete agreement.18 But this lower bound
must be lower than the upper bound for d, αN/(2N − 1) we have defined above and ensures no
over adaptation, that requires that
γc >

(2 − β)N − 1
> 2N − 1 for β ∈ (0, 1).
(1 − β)

We can summarize all these constraints on parameters values in the following assumption
Assumption 2 We assume that 2N − 1 < ((2 − β)N − 1)/(1 − β) < γc and d ∈ [αN/((1 −
β)γc + βN ), αN/(2N − 1)) for β ∈ (0, 1).
Thus, this assumption guarantees that the non-negativity constraints are satisfied, that
marginal damages are higher than a positive lower bound and that the SOC are also satisfied.
Next, we compare net benefits. The non-signatories invest more in adaptation and pollute
more than signatories. Thus, the non-signatories will have larger benefits and lower damages
than signatories, but higher adaptation costs. In order to compare net benefits, we need to
calculate net benefits for both non-signatories and signatories. Using the previous expressions for
emissions, marginal damages, total emissions and the adaptation level, we obtain the following
expression for the non-signatories net benefits

Wf =

w4f n4 + w3f n3 + w2f n2 + w1f n + w0f
,
2((γc)2 − (N + n − 1)γc + (n − 1)(N − n))2

(40)

where
w4f = α2 − γcd2 ,

w3f = 2 γcd2 − α2 (N − γc + 1) ,


w2f = 2(γc)3 d2 +(γc)2 3d2 − 2N dα − α2 −γc (4N + N 2 + 1)d2 − 2N dα − (N 2 − 4)α2 +α2 (4N + 1) ,



w1f = −2 (γc + 1) ((γc)2 α2 − 2N d(α − d) −γc N (N + 1)d2 − 2N dα − (N 2 − 1 − 2N )α2 +N α2 ),
18

Notice that as expected this is a stronger constraint than d > αN/γc.
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w0f = γc (γc + 1)2 (α − d) (α − (2N − 1)d)γc + N (N − 2)α + N 2 d .
and the following expression for signatories countries
Ws =

w4s n4 + w3s n3 + w2s n2 + w1s n + w0s
,
2((γc)2 − (N + n − 1)γc + (n − 1)(N − n))2

(41)

where
w4s = α2 − γcd2 ,

w3s = 2 γcd2 − α2 (N − γc + 1) ,
w2s = γcd2 − α2




(γc)2 + 4γc − N 2 − 4N − 1 ,



w1s = −2 (γc)3 2N d2 − 2N dα + α2 − (γc)2 (N 2 − 1 − N )d2 − N (N + 2)α2


−γc N (N + 1)d2 − (N 2 − 1 − N )α2 + N α2 (N + 1)
w0s = (γc + 1) −(γc)3 (α − d) ((2N − 1)d − α) + (γc)2 +2N d2 − N 2 d2 + (N 2 − 2N + 1)α2





−N γc +N d2 − (N − 2)α2 + N 2 α2 .
Next, we calculate the difference in net benefits using (40) and (41)
Wf − Ws =

(n − 1)(1 + γc + n(γc − 1))(γcd − αN )2
,
2((γc)2 − (N + n − 1)γc + (n − 1)(N − n))2

(42)

that is positive since we have assumed that γc > 2N − 1. As occurs for the case of a complete
agreement, non-signatories have larger net benefits than signatories for all levels of cooperation.
On the other hand, it is easy to check that emissions for both non-signatories and signatories
decreases as the number of signatories increases. Thus, cooperation decreases both emission and
adaptation. The same occurs with total emissions as the following expressions show
∂es
1
γc(γcd − αN )(γc + 2n − N − 1)
=−
< 0,
2
∂n
γ ((γc) − (N + n − 1)γc + (n − 1)(N − n))2
∂es
1
(γcd − αN )((2n − 1)γc − (n − 1)2 )
=−
< 0,
∂n
γ ((γc)2 − (N + n − 1)γc + (n − 1)(N − n))2
∂E
c(γcd − αN )((2n − 1)γc − (n − 1)2 )
=−
< 0.
∂n
((γc)2 − (N + n − 1)γc + (n − 1)(N − n))2
All these derivatives are negative if conditions of Assumption 2 are satisfied. Now, if we look
at net benefits, it is clear that benefits and adaptation costs decrease with participation, but it
is not clear what occurs with damages. As in the complete agreement, damages can increase
or decrease with participation both for signatories and non-signatories, but again regardless
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of damages increase or decrease, cooperation has a positive effect on net benefit for both nonsignatories and signatories.19 Signatories internalize the negative externality caused by pollution
and as a result of this the net benefits increase monotonically with membership.
Taking the first derivative of the net benefits with respect to n for signatories yields
∂es ∂as
∂W s
∂es
∂E
∂as
=α
− γes
+
E − (d − as )
− cas
,
∂n
∂n
∂n
∂n
∂n
∂n
that taking into account that the effect of participation in total emissions is given by (18) can
be reorganized as follows
∂W s
∂es
∂as
∂es
∂ef
= (α − γes − (d − as ))
+ (E − cas )
− (d − as )(es + (n − 1)
− ef + (N − n)
),
∂n
∂n
∂n
∂n
∂n
where the first term of the RHS is zero according to FOC (25) and
E − cas =

(γc)2

c (γcd − N α) (n − 1)
= (d − as )(n − 1),
− (N + n − 1)γc + (n − 1)(N − n)

that gives


∂W s
∂as ∂es
∂ef
s
f
s
= (d − a ) (n − 1)(
−
) + e − e − (N − n)
,
∂n
∂n
∂n
∂n
where ∂as /∂n = ∂es /∂n according to (26). Thus, we obtain the following expression for the
derivative of signatories’ net benefits with respect to n


∂W s
∂ef
s
f
s
= (d − a ) e − e − (N − n)
> 0,
∂n
∂n

(43)

since ef > es and non-signatories emissions decrease with the number of signatories.
Proceeding in the same way, the derivative of non-signatories net benefits can be written as
follows
∂W f
∂af
∂es
∂ef
= (E − caf )
− (d − af )(es + n
− ef + (N − n − 1)
),
∂n
∂n
∂n
∂n
where from second stage FOCs E = caf resulting in
∂es
∂ef
∂W f
= (d − af )(ef − es + n
+ (N − n − 1)
) > 0,
∂n
∂n
∂n

(44)

since ef > es and emissions for both signatories and non-signatories decrease with participation. Thus, we find that the there are positive spillovers for non-signatories stemming from
cooperation, i.e. cooperation increases the non-signatories’ net benefits as occurs in the case
of the complete agreement. Moreover, it is easy to show that the difference in net benefits
19

We omit the details of this claim in order to shorten the extension of the paper.
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given by (42) also increases with the participation. Lastly, we claim that the game presents
the property of full cohesiveness.20 To end this subsection we would like to point out that all
these features of the PANE of the second stage are the same we have found for the case of the
complete agreement.

4.3

The first stage: the Nash equilibrium of the membership game

In this subsection, we investigate which is the level of participation an adaptation agreement
can achieve. For this type of agreement, the stability function S(n) reads as follows

S(n) = −

((γc)2

(n − 1)(γcd − αN )2 F (n)
,
− (n + N − 2)γc + (N + 1 − n)(n − 2))2 ((γc)2 + (N + n − 1)γc − (n − 1)(N − n))2
(45)

where the denominator is positive and F (n) is a polynomial of fifth degree

F (n) = f5 n5 + f4 n4 + f3 n3 + f2 n2 + f1 n + f0 ,

(46)

with
f5 = γc − 1 > 0,
f4 = 2(γc)2 − (5 + 2N )γc + 5 + 2N > 0,
f3 = −(γc)3 − 11(γc)2 + (12 + N 2 + 6N )γc − 10N − N 2 − 8 < 0,
f2 = −2(γc)4 + (4N − 1)(γc)3 − (2N 2 − 6N − 19)(γc)2 − (N 2 + 6N + 16)γc + 16N + 5N 2 + 4 < 0
f1 = (γc)5 −(2N −11)(γc)4 +(N 2 −12N +4)(γc)3 +(N 2 −6N −16)(γc)2 −(6N 2 −8N +8)γc−8N −8N 2 > 0,
f0 = −3(γc)5 +(2N −7)(γc)4 +(N 2 +2N +4)(γc)3 +(5N 2 −8N +8)(γc)2 +(8N 2 −8N )γc+4N 2 < 0,
for N ≥ 3 provided that γc > 2N − 1.21 Analyzing this polynomial, we can conclude that
Proposition 4 For interior solutions and N ≥ 11, if the degree of effectiveness of adaptation
p
1 − β is larger than or equal to (N 2 − 4N + 3)/(2 + (N − 2) (N 2 − 4N + 7)) the grand coalition
is stable. However, if it is lower than this threshold value there exists only one stable adaptation
agreement with a minimum of participation of three countries and a maximum of six countries.
20

We omit the proof of these two properties because it follows the same steps we have used to show them for

the case of a complete agreement.
21
We study the sign of these coefficients in the Appendix.
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Proof. See Appendix 5.
As occurs for the complete agreement, the grand coalition could be stable too for an adaptation agreement, but we also have in this case that the limit of effectiveness of adaptation that
defines the interval for which the grand coalition is stable converges to one very quickly with
the total number of countries. For instance, for N = 20, 1 − β = 0.9863 what implies that the
grand coalition is able to reduce the marginal damages in a 98.63% through the investment in
adaptation yielding a vulnerability for the country equal to 0.0137. For N = 100, we obtain
that 1 − β = 0.9995 that gives a vulnerability of 0.0005. The levels of effectiveness of adaptation that stabilize the grand coalition for an adaptation agreement are very similar to those we
obtain for a complete agreement. Thus, there are not big differences between the two types of
agreements except that if the grand coalition is not stable, an adaptation agreement could be
formed with the double of countries that a complete agreement allows, six instead of three.22
But, in practical terms this is not a big difference because in any case the participation in an
IEA is very low.
Finally, we would like to highlight that the model suggests that the participation decreases
as the effectiveness of adaptation decreases. For instance, if we evaluate F (n) for n = 6, we
obtain the following polynomial in c



F (γc; n = 6) = 3(γc)5 − (γc)4 (10N + 13) + (γc)3 7N 2 + 74N − 224 − (γc)2 −172N + 61N 2 − 812

+8γc −184N + 19N 2 + 408 − 80 (N − 6)2 ,
so that the polynomial equation could have until five positive real roots. But we know that
F (γc = 2N − 1; n = 6) = −8N 5 + 136N 4 − 986N 3 + 2096N 2 + 4590N − 5124,
is negative for N ≥ 6. With five roots, the function will have three inflection points given by
the solution to


F 00 (γc; n = 6) = 60(γc)3 −12(γc)2 (10N + 13)+6γc 7N 2 + 74N − 224 −2 61N 2 − 172N − 812 ,
22

Interestingly, El-Sayed and Rubio (2014) also obtain for a technological agreement that the maximum partic-

ipation consists of six countries and that the participation decreases as spillovers efffects increase until a minimum
of three countries. In their model, the investment reduces the abatement costs and the marginal damages are
linear.
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where the second derivative is taken respect to γc. If we evaluate this derivative for γc = 2N −1,
we obtain that F 00 (γc = 2N − 1; n = 6) is positive for N ≥ 5. This means that γc = 2N − 1
could be between the first inflection point and the second inflection point or on the right of the
third inflection point. To advance in the analysis, we need to calculate the third derivative

F 000 (γc; n = 6) = 180(γc)2 − 24γc (10N + 13) + 6 7N 2 + 74N − 224 ,
that says us that the second derivative has two extremes, first a maximum and then a minimum.
As F 000 (γc = 2N − 1; n = 6) is positive for N ≥ 4, γc = 2N − 1 could be on the left of the
maximum or on the right of the minimum, but it is easy to show that the slope of F 000 (γc =
2N − 1; n = 6) is positive that implies that γc = 2N − 1 is greater than the minimum of
F 00 (γc; n = 6), but moreover F 00 (γc = 2N − 1; n = 6) is positive which means that is greater
than the third inflection point and we also know that F (γc = 2N − 1; n = 6) < 0. With all this
information, we can conclude that γc = 2N − 1 is between the fourth root and the fifth root
of F (γc; n = 6) = 0, so that in the interval between γc = 2N − 1 and the fifth root, F (6) < 0
and consequently S(6) > 0 and n = 6 is a stable agreement.23 However, if γc is higher than the
fifth root, F (6) > 0 and n = 6 becomes an unstable agreement. But, as ((2 − β)N − 1)/(1 − β)
is an increasing strictly convex function of β, we can conclude that the the threshold value of β
associated to the γc = 2N − 1 is lower than the one corresponding to the fifth root of F (6) = 0.
Thus, as β is inversely related with the degree of effectiveness of adaptation, we can conclude
that if the effectiveness of adaptation is bellow the level defined by the fifth root of F (n) = 0,
an agreement consisting of 6 countries cannot be stable. In other words, there exists a threshold
value for the degree of effectiveness of adaptation for n = 6 bellow which this agreement cannot
be stable.24
This argument is illustrated in Fig. 1. In this graph, we plot the implicit function defined
by F (n, γc, N ) = 0 for N = {10, 50, 100}.
⇒ Figure 1 ⇐
The figure shows that the participation is decreasing with adaptation costs for the different
values of N. Using the argument we have just presented we can also say that the membership
is directly related with the degree of effectiveness of adaptation or in other words inversely
23
24

Notice that in the proof of Proposition 4, we show that S(7) < 0.
We would like to highlight that the same kind of argument argument leading to the same conclusion can be

developed if F (6) = 0 has three roots or only one, and also for n = {4, 5}.
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related to the vulnerability of the country to the environmental problem. In the graph, F (n) is
positive above the curves and negative bellow the curves. For instance, for N = 50 and n = 6,
the distance between the point defined by γc = 2N − 1 = 99 and the value γc determined by
the curve for n = 6 defines the interval of values for γc that makes stable the agreement. This
distance increases as n decreases, but in the three cases we find the curves are decreasing with
respect to γc. The conclusion is obvious, if the effectiveness of adaptation is very low, the only
stable agreement consists of three countries.
Finally, we study the relationship between the gains coming from full cooperation and the
level of participation in the agreement. For an adaptation agreement the gains from full cooperation are given by the following expression
W s (N ) − W f (1) =

(N − 1)2 (γcd − αN )2
> 0,
2γ(γc − 2N + 1)(γc − N )2

(47)

that is positive since, according to Assumption 2, γc > 2N − 1. As occurs with the complete
agreement, we know from the proof of Proposition 4 that for any given value of γ, the grand
coalition will be stable if
p
(N − 2)((N − 1) + (N 2 − 4N + 7))
.
c≤
γ(N − 3)

(48)

Then, if we obtain that the gains from full cooperation increase with respect to c we could
conclude that when the gains from full cooperation are large, the cooperation is unstable.
To find the effect that an increase in c has on (47), we calculate the first derivative with
respect to this parameter that yields the following expression
(N − 1)2 (γcd − αN )G(γc)
∂(W s (N ) − W f (1))
=−
,
∂c
2(γc − 2N + 1)2 (γc − N )3

(49)

G(γc) = d(γc)2 − N (3α − d)γc + N (α(5N − 2) − d(4N − 2)).

(50)

where

The denominator is positive if γc > 2N − 1 and if the marginal damages are positive γcd must
be greater than αN . If the polynomial equation has two roots, it is easy to check that the
first root is not relevant for the analysis because is lower than 2N − 1. Substituting in (50) we
obtain that
G(2N − 1) = d(2N − 1)2 − N (3α − d)(2N − 1) + N (α(5N − 2) − d(4N − 2))
= − (N − 1) (N α − (2N − 1)d) < 0,
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according to Assumption 2. If the polynomial equation has two roots, as the independent term
is positive, the polynomial is positive between zero and the first root, negative between the first
and the second root, and again positive on the right on the second root. Thus, if G(2N −1) < 0,
we can conclude that the first root is lower than 2N −1. Then the only relevant root is the second
one, that defines a maximum for (47). On the other hand, the threshold value γc = αN/d is
also a stationary point of (47). This stationary point is a minimum given that
∂ 2 (W s (N ) − W f (1))
∂(γc)2

=
αN
d

αd5 (N − 1)2
(α − d)2 N 2 (αN − (2N − 1)d)

which is always positive because d < αN/(2N − 1) according to Assumption 2. Moreover,
this minimum must be on the left of the second root of (50) since the gains of cooperation
must decrease for enough high values of c. Notice that for the gains of cooperation (47), the
denominator is cubic in c and cuartic in γ whereas for the numerator the expression is quadratic
in c and γ. Moreover, for this reason the polynomial equation G(γc) = 0 must have two roots
because with G(γc) > 0 for all γc, (49) would be negative on the right of the minimum that is a
contradiction. Thus, as the stability of the grand coalition requires that γc is below the upper
bound defined by (48) we will have that γc is also very close of the minimum of the difference in
gains with a net marginal damage close to zero because the effectiveness of adaptation is very
large. Therefore this means that as we increase γc we move towards the maximum of gains
from full cooperation but then the grand coalition is not stable. So up to now we have the usual
large but shallow coalition, however we should mention that after the maximum, the function
is decreasing and theoretically we could have smaller coalition with similar or even lower gains
from cooperation than the grand coalition. Nevertheless, this is only a small difference with the
previous case that we want to mention for completeness because this will occur for enough high
values of γc even in this case the differences in gains would be insignificant compared to the
differences in gains when small agreements correspond to values of γc close to the maximum.
Therefore we can claim that we still observe the cited paradox for the adaptation agreement.

5

Conclusions

This paper analyzes the stability of an IEA when countries invest in adaptation before they
take their decisions on emissions. We consider two types of agreements with linear damages: a
complete agreement for which signatories coordinate their levels of adaptation and emissions,
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and an adaptation agreement where signatories only cooperate when they decide on investment
in adaptation. Moreover, we assume that this investment can reduce the vulnerability of the
country, but not bellow a positive lower bound. This means that we are bounding from above
the effectiveness of adaptation technology to include, in our opinion, a more realistic modeling of
its possible effects. To address the issue of stability we propose a three-stage coalition formation
game where in the first stage countries decide whether or not to sign the IEA. Then, in the second
stage, signatories (playing together) and non-signatories (playing individually) select their levels
of adaptation. In the third stage, each country decides on its emissions noncooperatively for
the adaptation agreement and signatories cooperate in the complete agreement. We solve this
game by backward induction.
The analysis shows that for both types of agreements, the properties of the adaptation
subgame played in the second stage coincide with the properties of the model without adaptation: Emissions decrease with participation; non-signatories’ net benefits are larger than the
signatories’ net benefits for all levels of participation: there are positive spillovers coming from
cooperation, i.e. the non-signatories’ net benefits increase with membership and the difference
in net benefits also increases with membership. Moreover, both models present the property of
full cohesiveness. However, we know that in the model without adaptation, emissions are strategic substitutes, but with adaptation the strategic relationship changes and the investments in
adaptation are strategic complements.
For the model with adaptation we obtain, that environmental damages can increase or
decrease with the number of signatories, the reason is that although total emissions decrease
when the agreement expands, the adaptation also decreases increasing the marginal damages.
Therefore there exists a non-trivial trade-off.
Our findings predict that the grand coalition can be stable for both types of agreements, but
for unrealistic levels of the degree of effectiveness of adaptation. For instance, a grand coalition
formed by one hundred countries requires a degree of effectiveness of adaptation of 99.96% for the
complete agreement, and 99.95% for an adaptation agreement. This means that the investment
in adaptation must be able to reduce the marginal damages in a percentage larger than 99%.
For these quantities the stability is sustained because the increase in adaptation costs that the
country exiting the coalition has to support turns the exit unprofitable. However, with more
realistic values for the effectiveness of adaptation, the model yields low levels of participation.
Three countries for a complete agreement and no more than six for an adaptation agreement.
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Thus, we could also conclude that it is clear that the complementarity between the investment
in adaptation does not have any relevant consequence in the incentive countries have to sign an
IEA.
Therefore one of the main conclusions of this paper is that, we agree with the newly claimed
results that the incursion of adaptation in IEAs may mathematically allow an enhance of participation, however, here we show analytically that this requires an extremely high reduction
of vulnerability through adaptation. For this reason, we believe that under any realistic assumption regarding the scope of adaptation technology, the inclusion of adaptation does not
enhance participation and therefore it should not be considered as a policy solution towards
larger agreements.
There are two obvious extensions for the game analyzed in this paper that could be addressed in future research. The first one is developing the stability analysis for a quadratic
damage function. The difficulty with the development of this analysis is that the model has
not an explicit solution and the analysis will have to be based on numerical methods. Another
interesting extension is to drop the assumption of symmetry. In the line of Lazkano et al. (2016)
paper, we could consider that countries have different adaptation costs. In this framework, it
would be interesting to investigate the role of cooperation in adaptation taking into account the
possibility of transfers between countries with different adaptation costs.
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A.1 Increasing W f − W s difference with participation
Given that we have previously shown that W f > W s , lets analyze how does this difference
vary with the level of participation. First, using (7) and (8) we obtain that the difference in net
benefits is
Wf − Ws =

α
1
1
(n − 1)(d − a(n)) −
(α − d + a(n))2 +
(α − nd + na(n))2
γ
2γ
2γ
=


1
(a(n) − d)2 n2 − 1 .
2γ

Taking the first derivative with respect to n gives the following expression
∂(W f − W s )
1
∂a
= − (d − a(n)) (n2 − 1) + (a(n) − d)2 n,
∂n
γ
∂n
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that is positive because adaptation decreases with respect to n and the net marginal damage,
d − a, is assumed positive.
A.2 Full cohesiveness
First, using that E = ca for both signatories and non-signatories, net benefits read
Wf =

1
((α2 − d2 ) − (γc − 1)(2da(n) − a(n)2 ))
2γ

for non-signatories and
Ws =

1
((α2 − d2 n2 ) − (γc − n2 )(2da(n) − a(n)2 )),
2γ

for signatories. Then the aggregate net benefits can be written as follows

W = nW s + (N − n)W f

=n

1
1
((α2 −d2 n2 )−(γc−n2 )(2da(n)−a(n)2 ))+(N −n) ((α2 −d2 )−(γc−1)(2da(n)−a(n)2 ))
2γ
2γ
=

1
((N α2 − (n3 + N − n)d2 ) + (n3 − n − (γc − 1)N )(2da(n) − a(n)2 )).
2γ

Substituting a(n) by (13) and taking the first derivative we obtain the following expression
∂W
(N α − γcd)2 P (n)
,
=
∂n
2γ (n2 − n + N − γc)3
where the denominator is negative provided that γc > N 2 and
P (n) = n4 + n3 + 3(γc − 1 − N )n2 − (4N (γc − 1) − 1)n + (2N − 1)γc − N.
For this polynomial 3(γc − 1 − N ), 4N (γc − 1) − 1 and (2N − 1)γc − N are positive if γc > N 2 .
Then, according to Descartes’ rule of signs, P (n) = 0 could have a maximum of two positive real
roots. As the independent term is positive if this is the case, the polynomial must be positive for
values of n lower than the smallest root and higher than the largest root and negative between
the two roots. In fact, it is easy to check that polynomial equation has two positive real roots
since for n = 1, the polynomial gives a negative value: P (1) = −2γc(N − 1). Moreover, we also
obtain a negative value for n = N, P (N ) = −(γc − N 2 )(N − 1)2 , so that we can conclude that
for all n ∈ [1, N ], P (n) must be negative and consequently ∂W/∂n > 0 since the denominator
is also negative for γc > N 2 .
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We begin this proof showing that the polynomial equation, F (n) = 0, defined by the polynomial (22) has at least one positive real root that is in the interval (3, 4). Calculating the values
of the polynomial for the extremes of this interval we obtain that for n = 3
F (3) = 4((N − 1)γc − N 2 − 3N ) ≥ 0,
for γc ≥ (N 2 + 3N )/(N − 1). If we compare this lower bound for γc with the one defined in
Assumption 1, we can establish the following relationships









>
<






2
2
N + 3N
N − βN
for β
=
=


N −1 

 1−β




 < 
 >











β3 =

3
.
2+N

Therefore an agreement consisting of three countries is internally stable if γc ≥ max[(N 2 +
3N )/(N − 1), (N 2 − βN )/(1 − β)]. Notice that if we impose an arbitrary upper bound on γc, as
limβ→1 (N 2 − βN )/(1 − β) = +∞ the agreement consisting of three countries could be unstable.
But, this will occur for very low values of the degree of effectiveness of adaptation that we
do not take into account in this analysis. Next, we check whether the agreement is externally
stable. For n = 4 we have that
F (4) = −(γc)2 + (20 + 6N )γc − 5N 2 − 56N − 144 < 0,
for γc = N 2 and N ≥ 7. Moreover, considering the product γc as the argument of the polynomial, the first derivative with respect to γc evaluated at γc = N 2 is also negative so that we can
establish that N 2 is larger than the highest root of F (4) = 0 and consequently that F (4) < 0
for γc > N 2 , and also for γc > (N 2 − βN )/(1 − β) since (N 2 − βN )/(1 − β) > N 2 . Then,
S(4) = W s (4) − W f (3) is also negative and W s (4) < W f (3) so that an agreement consisting
of three countries is also externally stable. Thus, we can conclude that there exists at least one
stable agreement consisting of three countries.
However, according to Descartes’ rules of signs F (n) = 0 could have three positive real roots.
Taking into account that the coefficients of the first derivative change the sign twice, we can
conclude that the function has two extremes. Moreover, as the coefficients of the the second
derivative also change the sign twice, we can conclude that the function has two inflection points.
As the independent term and the leading coefficient of this polynomial are negative we know
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that until the first inflection point the function is concave, between the first and the second
inflection point is convex and on the right of the second inflection point is again concave. Then,
the first extreme will be a minimum and the second extreme a maximum and the function will
be positive between zero and the first root, negative between the first root and the second root,
positive again between the second root and the third root, and finally negative on the right of
the third root.
Next, we investigate whether the grand coalition could be stable. If this is the case, F (N )
must be positive or zero.25 A first straightforward conclusion is that then N must be higher
than the second root and lower than or equal to the third root, since one of the three roots is
between 3 and 4 and its slope is negative. This means that the lowest root of F (n) = 0 is in
this interval. Next, we evaluate F (n) at N. The result is

F (N ) = −(N − 3)(γc)2 + (N 3 − 3N 2 + 2N − 2)γc − N 2 (N − 2)(N 2 − N + 2).
Doing F (N ) = 0, we obtain a second degree equation for c that has two positive roots
(γc)1 = N 2 < (γc)2 = N 2 +
so that for γc ∈ (N 2 , N 2 +

4(N −1)
N −3 ],

4(N − 1)
,
N −3

F (N ) ≥ 0 and the grand coalition is stable. However,

according to Assumption 1, γc must be larger than (N 2 − βN )/(1 − β) > N 2 . As this lower
bound for γc is increasing with β and is equal to N 2 for β = 0, we can calculate the critical
value for β that defines the set of values for this parameter for which the grand coalition is
stable solving the following equation
N2 +

4(N − 1) N 2 − βN
−
= 0,
N −3
1−β

that yields
βN =

4
,
N 2 − 3N + 4

and a degree of effectiveness equal to
1 − βN =
Thus, if γc ∈ (N 2 , N 2 +

4(N −1)
N −3 ]

N 2 − 3N
.
N 2 − 3N + 4

the grand coalition is stable for β ∈ (0, βN ]. In this case, we

have a first root between 3 and 4, a second root between 4 and N, and a third root on the
25

Notice that for the grand coalition, the agreement is stable if it is internally stable.
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right of N.26 However, if γc > N 2 + (4(N − 1))/(N − 3), F (N ) < 0 and the grand coalition
is not stable. Then, it is easy to check that N is on the left of the second root of F (n) = 0
and that consequently there is only one stable agreement consisting of three countries. Notice
that if γc = N 2 + (4(N − 1))/(N − 3), F (N ) = 0, and N is a root of F (n) = 0. However,
it could be the second or the third root. To solve this question we need to check the slope of
the root because the second one has a positive slope and the slope of the third one is negative.
Evaluating the first derivative of F (n) at n = N we obtain the following expression

F 0 (N ) = −(γc)2 + (6N 2 − 14N + 6)γc − 5N 4 + 14N 3 − 14N 2 + 8N,
that is positive for c = N 2 + (4(N − 1))/(N − 3)


4(N − 1)
(N − 1)2 2
2
0
F N ; γc = N +
=8
(N − 6N + 7) > 0.
N −3
(N − 3)2
Thus, we can conclude that for γc = N 2 +(4(N −1))/(N −3), N is the second root of F (n) = 0,
so that for γc > N 2 + (4(N − 1))/(N − 3), F (N ) must be negative, because on the right of
the second root the function takes positive values. Thus, N will be between the first and the
second root and the only stable agreement consists of three countries.
A.4 Signs of the coefficients of F (n) for the adaptation agreement
It is trivial under assumption γc > 2N − 1 that f5 > 0. f4 is a quadratic function of γc with
positive (γc)2 coefficient. Its roots are:
p
1
(5 + 2N ± 4N 2 + 4N − 15)
4
It is easy to check that positive root which is the largest root is smaller than 2N − 1 for any
positive value of N . Let’s suppose the contrary
p
1
(5 + 2N + 4N 2 + 4N − 15) ≥ 2N − 1,
4
what implies that
4N 2 + 4N − 15 − (6N − 9)2 = −32N 2 + 112N − 96 ≥ 0,
but this is a contradiction for N ≥ 3. Therefore we can conclude that f4 > 0 for γc > 2N − 1.
For f3 according to Descrates’ rule of signs, f3 (c) = 0 could have two positive real roots. With
26

Notice that between 3 and 4 with F (3) > 0 and F (4) < 0 we cannot have more than one root. Theoretically,

we could have three root, but then F (N ) could not be positive.
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negative values on the left of the first root and on the right of the second root. Evaluating f3
at γc = 2N − 1, we obtain a negative value
f3 (2N − 1) = −6N 3 − 22N 2 + 46N − 30 < 0 for N ≥ 2,
and also a negative value for the first derivative
f30 (2N − 1) = −11N 2 − 26N + 31 < 0 for N ≥ 2.
Then, taking into account that the function is concave for all γc > 0, 2N − 1 must be larger
than the second root and we can conclude that f3 < 0 for all γc > 2N − 1. f2 (γc) = 0 according
to Descartes’ rule of signs could have three positive real roots with negative values on the right
of the third root. If we show that 2N − 1 is on the right of the third root we could conclude that
f2 is negative for all γc > 2N − 1. We cannot obtain the roots of the polynomial equation, but
if we obtain that f2 (2N − 1) is negative and that 2N − 1 is higher than the highest inflection
point of the function, we could conclude that f2 is negative for all γc > 2N − 1. Evaluating the
function at 2N − 1 we obtain the following expression

f2 (2N − 1) = −8N 4 + 38N 3 + 32N 2 − 74N + 38 < 0 for N ≥ 6.
Now, as the second derivative of f2 is a quadratic function we can calculate the inflection points.
The largest is

6(4N − 1) + (12 72N + 16N 2 + 307 )1/2
(γc) =
.
48
i

Let’s suppose that

6(4N − 1) + (12 72N + 16N 2 + 307 )1/2
(γc) =
≥ 2N − 1,
48
i

which implies that

12 72N + 16N 2 + 307 − (72N − 42)2
= −4992N 2 + 6912N + 1920 ≥ 0,
that is a contradiction for N ≥ 2. Then, γc = 2N − 1 is greater than the second inflection point
and must be on the right of the third root of f2 (γc) = 0, so that for γc > 2N − 1, f2 < 0. For
f1 we follow the same argument we have used for f2 except that now the function takes positive
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values on the right of the third root. Evaluating the function at 2N − 1 we obtain the following
result
f1 (2N − 1) = 8N 5 + 56N 4 − 178N 3 + 94N 2 − 18N − 2 > 0 for N ≥ 2.
Next, we calculate the second derivative
f100 = 20(γc)3 − 12(2N − 11)(γc)2 + 6(N 2 − 12N + 4)γc + 2(N 2 − 6N − 16),
so that f100 (γc) = 0 will give the two positive inflection points the function has. On the left of the
first inflection point, f100 is positive and the function is convex, between the the two inflection
points f100 is negative and the function is concave and, finally, on the right of the second inflection
point f100 is again positive and the function is again convex. If we evaluate the second derivative
at 2N − 1 we obtain a positive value

f100 (2N − 1) = 76N 3 + 236N 2 − 324N + 56 > 0 for N ≥ 2.
But, 2N − 1 could be on the left of the first inflection point or on the right of the second
inflection point. To find out which is the case, we need to calculate the third derivative

f1000 = 60(γc)2 − 24(2N − 11)γc + 6(N 2 − 12N + 4).
This derivative is zero for the following values
p
24(2N − 11) ± 288 (−28N + 3N 2 + 222)
γc =
,
120
that define two extremes for the second derivative. The lowest value is a maximum and the
highest value is a minimum. It is easy to check that 2N − 1 is higher than the minimum.
Let’s suppose that
24(2N − 11) +

p
288 (−28N + 3N 2 + 222)
≥ 2N − 1,
120

which implies that

288 −28N + 3N 2 + 222 − (192N + 144)2
= −36 000N 2 − 63 360N + 43 200 ≥ 0,
that is a contradiction for N ≥ 2. Then as f100 (2N − 1) is positive, 2N − 1 must be higher than
the highest inflection point and as f (2N − 1) is also positive, 2N − 1 must be higher than the
46
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third root of f1 (γc) = 0 and we can conclude that f1 > 0 for all γc > 2N − 1. Finally, f0 (γc) = 0
has a unique positive real root with a leading coefficient negative. So, if f0 (2N − 1) is negative,
f0 will be negative for γc > 2N − 1 as is the case

f0 (2N − 1) = 2N −28N 4 + 44N 3 + 5N 2 − 26N + 9 < 0 for N ≥ 2.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Notice firstly that S(n) = 0 only if F (n) = 0. Thus, we can focus on the analysis of
polynomial equation F (n) = 0. As the leading coefficient of F (n) is positive and its independent
term is negative, the polynomial equation has at least one positive root. Next, we show that
if there exists only one positive root, it is larger than 2 and lower than 7. To claim this, we
need to show that F (3) is negative and F (7) is positive. For n = 3, F (n) yields the following
polynomial in γc
F (γc; n = 3) = −2(2γc − 1)G(γc),

(51)

where
G(γc) = (N − 2)(γc)3 − (N 2 − 4)(γc)2 + (2N 2 − 7N + 3)(γc) − (N − 3)2 .
Therefore to show that F (γc) is negative we need to show that G(γc) is positive for γc >
2N − 1. G(γc) presents three changes of sign for the coefficients and according to the Descartes’
rule of signs, the polynomial equation could have a maximum of three positive real roots. With
positive values on the right of the third root since the leading coefficient is positive. If we show
that 2N − 1 is on the right of the third root, we could conclude that G(γc) is positive for all
γc > 2N − 1. However, we cannot calculate the roots of the polynomial equation, but if we
obtain that G(2N − 1) is positive and that 2N − 1 is higher than the highest inflection point
of the function, we could conclude that G(γc) is positive for all γc > 2N − 1 and consequently
F (γc; n = 3) negative. Evaluating the function at 2N − 1 we obtain the following expression
G(2N − 1) = 4N 4 − 20N 3 + 28N 2 − 10N − 6 > 0 for N ≥ 4.
Next, as the second derivative de G(γc) is a quadratic function we can calculate the inflection
points. The largest is
i

(γc) =

N2 − 4 +

p
(N − 2) (17N − 4N 2 + N 3 − 17)
3(N − 2)

Let’s suppose that
i

(γc) =

N2 − 4 +

p
(N − 2) (17N − 4N 2 + N 3 − 17)
≥ 2N − 1,
3(N − 2)
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which implies that

(N − 2) 17N − 4N 2 + N 3 − 17 − (5N 2 − 15N + 10)2
= −24N 4 + 144N 3 − 300N 2 + 249N − 66 ≥ 0,
that is a contradiction for N ≥ 3. So that, γc = 2N − 1 is greater than the second inflection
point and must be on the right of the third root of G(γc) = 0 since G(2N − 1) is positive. Then,
we can conclude that for γc > 2N − 1, G(γc) > 0 and S(3) > 0. Obviously, if G(γc) = 0 has
only one positive root, since the independent term is negative we obtain the same conclusion.
Next, we show that F (n) is positive for n = 7. For n = 7, F (n) yields the following
polynomial in γc
F (γc; n = 7) = 2(2(γc)5 − 2(7 + 3N )(γc)4 + (4N 2 + 57N − 180)(γc)3 − (43N 2 − 122N − 928)(γc)2
+65(2N 2 − 23N + 63)γc − 75(N − 7)2 ),

(52)

where all polynomials in N are positive for N > 8. F (γc; n = 7) presents five changes in
the sign of coefficients and according to the Descartes’ rule of signs, the polynomial equation
F (γc; n = 7) = 0 could have five, three or one positive real root. However, regardless of the
equation has five or three roots if we have that if F (2N − 1; n = 7) is positive and 2N − 1 is
larger than the highest inflection point as the leading coefficient of (52) is positive, we could
conclude as in the previous case that F (γc; n = 7) > 0 for γc > 2N − 1. For γc = 2N − 1, we
have the following expression
F (2N − 1; n = 7) = 88N 4 − 1432N 3 + 4232N 2 + 12 268N − 13 356 > 0 for N ≥ 11.
Now, we calculate the second derivative
F 00 (γc; n = 7) = 2(40c3 − 24(7 + 3N )c2 + 6(4N 2 + 57N − 180)c − 2(43N 2 − 122N − 928)).
Thus, the function could have three or only one inflection point. If the function has three
inflection point, the function is convex between the first inflection point and the second inflection
point and on the right of the third inflection point. If we evaluate the second derivative at 2N −1
we obtain a positive value
F 00 (2N − 1; n = 7) = 160N 3 − 580N 2 − 2836N + 5456 > 0 for N ≥ 6.
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But then, 2N − 1 could be between the the first inflection point and the second inflection point
or on the right of the third inflection point. To progress in the argumentation, we need to
calculate the third derivative
F 000 (γc; n = 7) = 2(120(γc)2 − 48(7 + 3N )γc + 6(4N 2 + 57N − 180)).
This derivative is zero for the following values
√
2(7 + 3N ) ± −117N + 16N 2 + 1096
i
(γc) =
,
10
that define two extremes for the second derivative. The lowest value is a maximum and the
largest value is a minimum. It is easy to check that 2N − 1 is higher than the minimum.
Let’s suppose that the highest value of γc is larger than 2N − 1
√
2(7 + 3N ) + −117N + 16N 2 + 1096
i
(γc) =
≥ 2N − 1,
10
which implies that
−117N + 16N 2 + 1096 − (14N − 24)2
= −180N 2 + 555N + 520 ≥ 0,
that is a contradiction for N ≥ 4. Then as 2N − 1 is higher than the minimum of the second
derivative and moreover F 00 (2N − 1; n = 7) is positive, 2N − 1 must be larger than the highest
inflection point. In this case, as F (2N − 1; n = 7) is also positive, 2N − 1 must be higher than
the the highest root of F (γc; n = 7) = 0 and we can conclude that F (γc; n = 7) > 0 for all
γc > 2N − 1. Finally, if F (γc; n = 7) = 0 has only one positive root as the leading coefficient
is positive and the independent term negative if F (2N − 1; n = 7) is positive, it is also positive
for all γc > 2N − 1. Thus, if S(3) > 0 and S(7) < 0, then there exists at least a value for n, n∗
such that S(n∗ ) = 0 and S 0 (n∗ ) < 0. If the root is a natural number, it defines the participation
in the stable agreement, if this is not the case, the stable agreement is given by the first natural
number on the left of n∗ .
However, according to Descartes’ rule of signs F (n) = 0 could have three positive real roots.
Taking into account that the coefficient of the first derivative change the sign twice, we can
conclude that the function has two extremes.27 Moreover, as the coefficients of the second
27

The function could be increasing for all n > 0, but in this case as the leading coefficient of F (n) is positive

and the independent tern negatve, F (n) = 0 would have only one positve root in the interval (3, 7) as we have
just showed.
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derivative only change the sign once, we can conclude that the function has one inflection point.
Moreover, as the independent term of the second derivative is negative and the leading coefficient
is positive, the function is first concave and on the right of the inflection point convex. Then,
the first extreme will be a maximum and the second extreme a minimum and the function will
be negative between zero and the first root, positive between the first root and the second root,
negative again between the second root and the third root, and finally negative on the right of
the third root.
Next, we investigate whether the grand coalition could be stable. If this is the case, F (N )
must be negative or zero. A first straightforward conclusion is that then N must be higher
than the second root and lower than or equal to the third root, since one of the three roots is
between 3 and 7 and its slope for F (n) is negative. Then if N > 7, the lowest root of F (n) = 0
must be in this interval. Next, we evaluate F (n) at N yielding the following expression

F (N ) = (γc)2 (γc + 1 − 2N ) ((γc)2 (N − 3) − 2γc (N − 1) (N − 2) + 2 (N − 2)2 ).

(53)

The sign of this expression depends of a second degree equation for γc that has two positive
roots
p
(N − 2)((N − 1) ± (N 2 − 4N + 7))
γc =
,
N −3
so that for γc in the close interval defined by these two roots, F (N ) ≤ 0 and the grand coalition
could be stable. Does 2N − 1 belong to this interval?
Let’s suppose that
p
(N − 2)((N − 1) − (N 2 − 4N + 7))
≥ 2N − 1,
N −3
which implies that
p
−N 2 + 4N − 1 ≥ (N − 2) (N 2 − 4N + 7) > 0,
that is a contradiction for N ≥ 4.
Next, let’s suppose that
p
(N − 2)((N − 1) + (N 2 − 4N + 7))
,
2N − 1 ≥
N −3
which implies that
(N 2 − 4N + 1)2 − (N − 2)2 N 2 − 4N + 7



50

https://services.bepress.com/feem

52

Borrero and Rubio: An Adaptation-Mitigation Game: Does Adaptation Promote Parti

= −9N 2 + 36N − 27 ≥ 0,
that is a contradiction for N ≥ 4.Thus, we can conclude that
!
p
p
(N − 2)((N − 1) − (N 2 − 4N + 7)) (N − 2)((N − 1) + (N 2 − 4N + 7))
,
2N − 1 ∈
,
N −3
N −3
(54)
However, according to Assumption 2, γc must be larger than (((2 − β)N − 1)/(1 − β) > 2N − 1.
As this lower bound for γc is increasing with β and is equal to 2N − 1 for β = 0. We can
calculate the critical value for β that defines the set of values for this parameter for which the
grand coalition is stable solving the following equation
p
(N − 2)((N − 1) + (N 2 − 4N + 7)) (2 − β)N − 1
−
= 0,
N −3
1−β
where the first term is the upper limit of the interval (54). The result os this equation is

βN

p
N 2 − 4N + 1 − (N − 2) (N 2 − 4N + 7)
p
=−
,
2 + (N − 2) (N 2 − 4N + 7)

and a degree of effectiveness of adaptation equal to
1 − βN =

N 2 − 4N + 3
p
.
2 + (N − 2) (N 2 − 4N + 7)

Thus, if
γc ∈

#
p
(N − 2)((N − 1) + (N 2 − 4N + 7))
2N − 1,
N −3

the grand coalition is stable for β ∈ (0, βN ]. In this case, we have a first root between 3 and
7, a second root between 7 and N , and a third root on the right of N.28 However, if γc >
p
(N − 2)((N − 1) + (N 2 − 4N + 7))/(N − 3), F (N ) > 0 and the grand coalition is not stable.
But, in this case it is easy to check that N will be on the left of the second root of F (n) = 0 and
that consequently there will be only one stable agreement with a number of signatories between
p
3 and 6. Notice that if γc = (N − 2)((N − 1) + (N 2 − 4N + 7))/(N − 3), F (N ) = 0, and N
is a root of equation F (n) = 0. However, it could be the second or the third root. To find out
which is the case, the only thing we have to do is to check the slope of the root because the
second one has a negative slope whereas the slope of the third root is positive. Evaluating the
28

Notice that between 3 and 7 with F (3) < 0 and F (7) > 0 we cannot have more than one root. Theoretically

we could have three root, but then F (N ) could not be negative.

51

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2021

53

Submission to Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers

first derivative of F (n) at n = N we obtain the following polynomial in γc, F 0 (N ) = γcH(γc)
where
H(γc) = (γc)4 − (6N − 11)(γc)3 + (6N 2 − 14N + 4)(γc)2 + (4N 3 − 20N 2 + 32N − 16)γc
−4N 3 + 18N 2 − 24N + 8,
that is negative for γc = (N − 2)((N − 1) +

F0

p
(N 2 − 4N + 7))/(N − 3),

!
p
(N − 2)((N − 1) + (N 2 − 4N + 7))
N; c =
N −3


(N − 2)2
4
3
2
2
4N
−
51N
+
191N
−
313N
+
209
(N − 3)4
p
3

+
−4N + N 2 + 7 (N − 2) −17N + 2N 2 + 25

p

− −4N + N 2 + 7 (N − 2) −21N + 2N 2 + 53 (N − 1)2 < 0 for N ≥ 2.
=−

p
(N 2 − 4N + 7))/(N − 3), N is the
p
second root of F (n) = 0. This implies that for c > (N − 2)((N − 1) + (N 2 − 4N + 7))/(N − 3),
Then, we can conclude that when γc = (N − 2)((N − 1) +

N must be on the left of the second root because on the right, the function takes negative values.
Thus, N will be between the first and the second root and in this case there is only one stable
agreement with a maximum of participation of six countries.
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